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Abstract
A type system for the higher order pi-calculus is presented, using boolean annota-
tions to carry information about the integrity of data. This extends previous work
by the authors for a first order calculus; we argue that in a higher order setting
certain notions of trustedness depend on the potential for communication during
execution. In addition, we develop a statically determinable method for performing
safe run-time trust coercions.
1 Introduction
Systems using mobile code have the potential to revolutionise the way we
access computing resources and information in general. This is because of the
tangible benefits such systems offer: the computing resources can be spread
across multiple locations; clients accessing remotely hosted applications receive
better performance by down-loading applets to perform some of the tasks that
would ordinarily have taken several transactions with the server to complete;
mobile agents can be transmitted to perform searching work of various kinds;
access to information need no longer be restricted to the machine it is stored
on; and so on.
These benefits do not come without corresponding risk of course; before
running code from a remote source on your machine one would be well ad-
vised to make certain it can do no harm, so it is no surprise that research
into ways of detecting, preventing and mitigating such dangers is flourish-
ing [3,12,17,18,23,24,25]. Some approaches focus on the code itself (such as
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proof-carrying code [12] and java byte-code verification [25]); others take a
sand-box approach, mitigating the damage possible from untrusted code (for
example, the box-pi calculus [17,18] and the java sand-box [25]); while still
others take the approach of examining the interactions between processes (for
example, protocol analysis [1,2], trust-based navigation [23,24] and the lattice-
based flow analysis approach [3]).
Many of these approaches utilise a types-based analysis; the benefits of a
strong typing system in preventing run-time errors are well known, so it is
perhaps natural to extend the type system to carry additional information
about the program such as its security level.
Of these though, most suffer from a lack of flexibility. As an example,
consider the case of data plus a signature (assuming that the signature algo-
rithm is unforgeable) sent along a potentially malicious channel. Due to the
danger of tampering a typical static system would mark all data as untrusted;
however in effect it has variable trustedness, because we now have the ability
to, on a case by case basis, determine the trustedness of each piece of data at
run-time.
An interesting approach to this problem was proposed by Ørbæk and Pals-
berg [13,14] allowing the programmer to specify coercions on the trustedness
of data, for example casting a variable as trusted after appropriate checks have
been made to determine that that was in fact the case. Three operators lie at
the heart of their system; two coercion operators (trust and distrust), and
a third, check, that is used to verify the trustedness of its argument. The in-
tention is that the programmer judiciously applies these operators at suitable
points in the program, then the compiler can calculate — statically — if the
program is safe with respect to data trustedness. An important result is that
if the annotated program is safe, then so is the same program stripped of the
three additional operators. While this is undoubtedly important research, it
still relies on the programmer to correctly use the operators (in that any data
is considered trusted if so coerced); in effect a program can be determined
safe, but only modulo correct use of trust coercion by the programmer (“With
great power comes great responsibility”!).
Seeking to address this issue, the authors introduced a system [4] in which
trust coercion is still available to the programmer, but its indiscriminate usage
is not: the direction of coercion (either trusted or untrusted) is determined
solely by the results of run-time verification procedures, and the execution
path also branches based on these results. In this manner the programmer
retains the flexibility of being able to use coercion, but loses the responsibility
of getting it right.
That work (which also differed from the functional [14] and imperative
implementations [13] of Ørbæk and Palsberg by considering a distributed sys-
tem) used a version of the first order pi-calculus for its analysis. Because of this
only atomic data could be considered; this is both restrictive and unrealistic:
as mentioned earlier, one of the main attractions of distributed computing is
2
Hepburn and Wright
allowing entire programs (agents) to be transmitted. This paper addresses
this issue by examining a higher-order modeling calculus; the additional flex-
ibility allows us to consider the ramifications of potentially malicious agents
moving through a network and running in different environments, and due
to the dynamic topology represented by the pi-calculus the possibility of new
connections being opened with unknown processes.
1.1 Examples and Motivation
We take a slightly different focus from other similar systems (commonly re-
ferred to as flow analysis), in that rather than examining programs to detect
data leakage (for example, data with a high security rating being exposed
to processes with a lower security clearance) we take the view that in many
situations this is unavoidable: much of the internet for example is potentially
exposed to the viewing and tampering of data. We accept this, and merely
wish to avoid using data that cannot be verified or trusted in any secure com-
putation. Elsewhere [4] this was achieved by making the trustedness of the
data received along a channel be related to the trustedness of the channel it-
self, so all data from an untrusted channel is likewise untrusted (the converse
is not true; we still permit untrusted data to be transmitted along trusted
channels).
In a higher-order situation things get a little more complicated. Because
processes themselves can be transmitted, potentially along channels that ex-
pose them to tampering, this implies that they too can be assigned a trusted-
ness value. Perhaps a logical extension of this assumption is that, just as data
from an untrusted channel is untrusted, so is data from an untrusted process.
However, it is still not that easy: we must consider what it means for a process
to be untrusted. For example, if an agent whose trustworthiness cannot be
guaranteed is run within a sand-box so that it is incapable of harming the sys-
tem, should it still be considered dangerous? We take the view that it should
not; that the final trustedness “rating” of an agent depends on its potential
to inflict harm or corrupt other agents in the environment in which it is run.
To achieve this in a type system we introduce the concept of contexts ;
constructs that carry information about the manner in which different parts
of a process are liable to be used. Every deduction for a program in our
system ends in an application of a rule called final ; this takes the information
embedded in the contexts and computes a final — environment dependent
— trust value. The information concerning the execution environment (for
example, the access ports in a sand-box) is also carried through a deduction
expressed as the external context. It should be noted that to recompute the
trustedness of an agent in a different setting currently the entire deduction
must be repeated; this is certainly inefficient and will hopefully be improved
upon in later work.
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1.2 Layout
The report is presented as follows. We first introduce the higher order calculus
we use in our modeling in section 2, then in section 3 describe a syntactic
extension to the language that forms the heart of our system. A type system is
described in section 4. An inference algorithm for the type system is presented
in section 5, then the safety of the system and the correctness of the algorithm
follows in section 6. We conclude in section 7.
No previous experience with the pi-calculus is assumed, however at least a
passing familiarity would be an advantage.
2 Preliminaries
The pi-calculus [10,11,9], based on CCS [8], was proposed by Milner, Parrow
and Walker as a way of reasoning about concurrency in a similar way that
the λ-calculus enables reasoning about computation. Reduction occurs as a
result of communication of data along channels; at its purest, all data is simply
channels and processes are made up of combinations of channels.
The higher-order pi-calculus was conceived as a logical extension in which
processes as well as channels could be transmitted along channels. San-
giorgi [16] demonstrated that the higher-order calculus could satisfactorily be
encoded in the first-order calculus, and that a similar mapping also preserved
typing information. 3 Nevertheless, the expression of higher order concepts
directly exposes the issues of security in a system with mobile processes and
provides a suitable environment for developing our ideas.
2.1 Syntax
We now consider the syntax formally, with a brief informal discussion of the
main constructs. Two processes executing in parallel, respectively denoted P
and Q, is written as P|Q. The construct P + Q denotes a choice of execution
between P or Q (but not both); this is a non-deterministic choice, but in
practice the outcome is usually decided by whichever has the prior opportunity
to reduce.
The main construct is that of communication, which occurs along named
channels. A process that sends the single name y along a channel x then
continues as the process P is written as x[y].P; note that the name being sent
is enclosed in square brackets and for additional clarity the output channel is
written with a bar over the top to distinguish it from an identically named
input channel. The dual of this construct is the process that receives, along
channel x, a variable which it binds to the name z in the process Q and is
written as x(z).Q. We note that most versions of the pi-calculus — including
3 Actually, sorting ; see section 2.3. The corresponding verification that the mapping pre-
served typing structure was presented by Vasconcelos [20].
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that used here — are polyadic; that is tuples of names are also allowed to be
transmitted. We will use the terms channel, data, and name interchangeably.
Let names be ranged over by x, y, z, and process variables by X and Y .
K refers to either a name or a process, and U and V to either a name or a
variable. The syntax we use is based on Vasconcelos’ [20] and is shown in
definition 2.1:
Definition 2.1
P ::=0 | !P | P|Q | P + Q | (νU)P | X | x(~U).P | x[ ~K].P
The remaining constructs require just a little explanation; 0 is the null process
that does nothing, and the restriction operator (νU)P creates a unique name
(resp. variable) with scope P. The replication construct !P represents an
infinite source of P and can be defined inductively as !P , P|!P. The reduction
rules (see section 2.2) guarantee that it does not replicate infinitely. It should
be noted that the syntax used in this material lacks constructs usually present
in other presentations; this is for reasons of simplicity, and an (informal)
justification is given in section 2.2.1.
2.2 Semantics
The semantics of the calculus are given in terms of a reduction semantics; in
the core calculus [9] there is a single reduction axiom, and three inference rules
on the axiom.
Firstly, let us define structural congruence on processes: this is fairly triv-
ial; letting P be the set of all processes then {P ,≡, |,0} forms an Abelian
monoid, and so does {P ,≡,+,0}. Processes are structurally congruent if
they are identical up to the renaming of bound names, and we also comment
on the scope of restrictions and replications. More formally:
Definition 2.2
P|Q ≡ Q|P P + Q ≡ Q+ P
P|0 ≡ P P + 0 ≡ P
P|(Q|R) ≡ (P|Q)|R P + (Q + R) ≡ (P + Q) + R
!P ≡ P|!P (νU)P|Q ≡ (νU)(P|Q) U /∈ FV (Q)
Now we can define our reduction semantics. The core axiom in the stan-
dard calculus is that of communication:
(. . .+ x[ ~K].P)|(x(~U).Q+ . . .)→ P|Q{ ~K/~U}
The three inference rules on this axiom can be summarised as: reduction
may occur under a restriction (but not under a communication prefix) or a
parallel composition, and structurally congruent terms have the same reduc-
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tions:
P→ P′
P|Q→ P′|Q
P→ P′
(νU)P→ (νU)P′
Q ≡ P P→ P′ P′ ≡ Q′
Q→ Q′
Note that they also do not allow reduction under replication; the replica-
tion must be expanded out as many times as necessary then the reduction
performed on the individual processes.
Definition 2.3 (Labeled Reductions) Occasionally it is useful to specify
the precise step involved in a reduction; basically, the name(s) communicated.
Given the reduction
x[ ~K].P|x(~U).Q→ P|Q{ ~K/~U}
then we label the individual redeces as follows:
x[ ~K].P
x[ ~K]−−→ P
x(~U).Q
x( ~K)−−−→Q{ ~K/~U}
We label an internal reduction — that is, one in which no other processes are
involved — as
x[ ~K].P|x(~U).Q τ−→ P|Q{ ~K/~U}
2.2.1 Abstractions and Applications
Readers familiar with other presentations of the higher-order pi-calculus [16,20]
may have noticed that our syntax does not admit abstractions or applications.
This is an intentional omission, driven by a desire for simplicity and the belief
that with some manipulation the benefits gained by admitting these constructs
can still be encoded in our core calculus.
Most versions of a higher-order pi-calculus include the ability to abstract a
process on one or more names or variables (e.g. (U)P, with the corresponding
ability (application) to instantiate the bound names/variables with given val-
ues, usually written as F〈K〉 where F is of the form (U)P. The usual argument
is that this makes the system truly higher-order, because as well as sending
processes you can send processes abstracted on arbitrary variables; we argue
though that informally (that is, we do not provide a formal translation, nor
do we claim that it would be trivial since as will be seen our informal encoding
involves changing the arity of names) the same benefits may be achieved using
our core calculus. We illustrate this claim with the following example (2.4):
Example 2.4 consider the following fragment of code (and associated reduc-
tion) in a system with abstraction and application:
x [(Y )P] .0|x(X).X〈Q〉→∗ (Y )P〈Q〉
→ P{Q/Y }
A similar reduction can be achieved by sending the process, in the form of an
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input located at a fresh name instead of as an abstraction, along with the name
at which it is located:
(νy)x [y (y(Y ).P)] .0|x(zX).(z[Q].0|X)→∗ (νy)(y[Q].0|y(Y ).P)
→∗ P{Q/Y }
2.3 A Type System
2.3.1 A First Notion of Types
We now sketch the type system most commonly used in the pi-calculus. The
primary goal of any type system is to prevent certain types of run-time errors
occurring: in the polyadic pi-calculus the most likely source of error is arity
mismatch; for example, a process sends three names to a process expecting to
receive only two. Thus our type system will enforce a policy on the number
(and type) of names that channels with that type can carry.
We start then by representing the type of a channel as a list of types. It is
necessary to be careful however, and distinguish between the type of names,
which can themselves carry other names, and the type of processes that can
merely be transmitted. To distinguish the two, we use parentheses for channel
types and square brackets for process types.
If we write types as σ with variables be ranged over by α, then our type
syntax becomes (definition 2.5):
Definition 2.5
σ ::= [] | (~σ) | α
The astute reader will no doubt have noticed that this scheme makes no
allowances for recursive types; for example, the types of channels capable of
transmitting themselves. This is a deliberate omission; the added complexity
(primarily in the unification algorithms used in type inference) of recursive
types detracts from the main thrust of this report which is a scheme for safe
run-time coercion. It is worth noting that early pi-calculus researchers favoured
a slightly different approach; that of a sorting as opposed to types. The
central concept is that each name is assigned a sort (an atom), then a separate
mapping (known as a sorting) is used to map sorts to lists of sorts that names
of that sort can carry. This has two advantages over self-contained types;
name-equivalence (as opposed to mere structural equivalence), and a simpler
treatment of recursion (recursion does not in fact exist as a separate concept,
since it is inherent in the sorting). The added complexity in the analysis
induced by the sorting though seems to out-weigh any benefits, and recent
researchers also appear to favour types (e.g. [20]). The interested reader is
referred to previous work by the authors which described a similar system to
that presented here, for the first-order calculus only, using sorts instead of
types [4].
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2.3.2 Adding Trustedness Information
Now to our base type structure we wish to add some additional information,
representing the integrity of the data or process in question. Note that al-
though in this paper we generally refer to “integrity” as meaning “untampered
with and from a trusted source” (that is, a security measure), it could just as
easily refer to, for example, the reliability of data, such as data received from
a noisy channel. The system presented does not distinguish in this matter.
The approach we take in adding annotations is based on that initially pro-
posed by Wright [22], using a boolean algebra structure. We take trustedness
(T) to correspond to truth or 1, and untrustedness (U) to correspond to false
or 0. The syntax of annotations, ranged over by b where variables are ranged
over by i, j, is shown in definition 2.6:
Definition 2.6 (boolexp)
b ::= i | T | U | b+ b | b · b | bˆ
The operations on annotations are inductively defined as follows:
Definition 2.7
b · T = b b+ T = T Tˆ = U
b · U = U b+U = b Uˆ = T
We will at times omit the ’·’ and simply write bc where the meaning is clear.
It will be seen later that the type system itself (section 4) makes no use of
summation or negation, however the boolean unification algorithm which will
be used in the inference algorithm (section 5) does, so for completeness we
define them now.
We also extend the definition of multiplication to cover types as well, with
the logical extension to cover sequences of types (definition 2.8):
Definition 2.8
b · σc=σbc
We additionally define the following relation:
Definition 2.9 Define ≤ (and, by extension, ≥) as being the least reflexive,
associative and transitive relation over annotations satisfying the following:
U ≤ b ≤ T
Our complete annotated type syntax can be seen in definition 2.10. Note
that because we do not admit abstractions in the term syntax, the only process
type is that of a well-formed process (that is, []).
Definition 2.10
σ ::= [] |
(
~σb
)
| α
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2.4 Execution Contexts
This type structure by itself is enough to guarantee several important prop-
erties, such as no data from an untrusted channel or process being used in a
trusted computation. However, as hinted at in the introduction, things be-
come more complicated in a higher order setting because we need to consider
what can cause a process to be “untrusted”. Some causes are (relatively)
trivial; a process received from an untrusted channel for example must be
considered untrusted as it may have been tampered with or replaced by a ma-
licious agent. Likewise, in an explicitly typed system (which we don’t consider
here) certain processes may be flagged as untrusted by the programmer. In
addition though, we take the view that a process may become corrupted if it
can communicate with an untrusted process.
To understand the motivation behind this decision it is wise to consider
a few salient examples. Consider first of all a program consisting of two
processes running in parallel, one trusted and the other untrusted. What
should the overall trustedness of the program be? A common reaction is
to assume untrusted (certainly the safest option). However if the untrusted
process is completely closed, that is it cannot communicate with anyone, then
it is probably reasonable to say that under those circumstances the program
could safely be considered trusted.
Consider a related case, consisting of a single malicious process that is not
closed yet none-the-less has no means of interacting (and therefore harming)
its environment. In this case too, it is probably safe to say that in that context
that process can be trusted.
As a final example, consider several processes running in parallel. The first,
ostensibly trusted, can interact with the environment (but is apparently safe).
A second, untrusted, cannot interact with the environment. However a third
process, although by itself not capable of interaction with the environment, can
communicate with both the (supposedly) trusted and the untrusted processes.
Now in this case it is conceivably possible for the untrusted process to use the
conduit process to corrupt the trusted process. For this reason, we argue that
in this situation all processes must be considered untrusted because they are
all capable of interacting, albeit indirectly (that is, it is transitively closed),
with an untrusted source and with the environment. (This example is revisited
more formally, with our solution, in example 4.4).
Our solution, based on these assumptions, is to carry an extra set of infor-
mation through a deduction which we call a context (written C). The structure
of a context is a mapping of all free names and variables in the process to an
annotation representing the trustedness of the process under which that name
is (or could be) used (note that this is potentially different to the annotation
on the name itself). Then a composition can only be formed between processes
where a union can be formed between their respective contexts; for example a
trusted process communicating on x would have x : T in its context, while an
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untrusted process might have x : U in its context and thus the new type rules
(section 4) would disallow the two to run in parallel (because the first pro-
cess can communicate with an untrusted entity so it must also be considered
untrusted).
We carry one final bit of information through a deduction; an immutable
construct we call the external context, written C² (definition 2.13). This rep-
resents the names through which communication with the environment can
occur (that is, it is a set of names; unlike regular contexts there is no associa-
tion with trust values). Any composition between processes must consider the
external context when calculating the overall trustedness of the two, as must
the final deduction (that is, the final rule that calculates the trustedness of a
process with respect to the execution environment).
Definition 2.11 (Contexts) C is a partial function
C :: datum × boolexp
Define the total function CT by extension:
CT (U) =
 b, if U : b ∈ CT otherwise
Definition 2.12 Write
C1 ³ C2 ⇐⇒ ∀U ∈ domC1 ∩ domC2 ⇒ C1(U) ≡ C2(U)
The operation C1,C2 is defined as C1 ∪ C2 iff C1 ³ C2.
Definition 2.13 (External Context)
C² :: datum
The external context always contains a single “top” element, which is distinct
from the set of names and variables contained in processes (and contexts).
This is to cover the situation in which there are no avenues of communication
with the environment (and thus the process can be considered trusted); recalling
that C(x) = T if x /∈ domC, so the operation
V
x∈C²C(x) is always defined.
2.5 Judgements
A valid deduction in the type system (see section 4) is expressed as a judge-
ment; the format of a judgement is shown in definition 2.14:
Definition 2.14 The judgement
Γ `C² P: []b;C
says that under the assumption set Γ the process P has the type [] (denoting a
well-formed process) with trustedness b, and has names operating with contexts
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described by the context set C. The alternate judgement form
Γ `C² P: []b
states as before that under assumptions Γ process P is well-formed and has
trustedness b; it represents the final outcome of a deduction in which contextual
information has been used and is no longer important. Following standard
practice, Γx represents the set Γ with all instances of x removed.
The complete set of rules for formulating such a valid deduction are pre-
sented in section 4.
3 Adding Certification-Based Run-time Coercion
Now we wish to extend the core calculus just presented with an additional
primitive to allow safe coercion: the approach we use is modeled on an example
presented by Ørbæk and Palsberg [14], which also serves to illustrate the
contrasts with their approach (example 3.1).
Example 3.1 (From Trust in the λ-Calculus [14]) The following code frag-
ment is intended to retrieve a piece of data and a signature from a network, and
only use the data if the signature can be verified. The expression “trust x”
means x is unconditionally trusted:
let (data, sig) = read_from_network in
if verify_signature(data, sig) then
handle_event(trust data)
else
handle_wrong_signature(data, sig)
where the handler code resembles
fun handle_event data =
let trusted_data = check data
in ...
The “check” construct only type-checks on trusted values; which is the case in
this example because the signature was verified and the appropriate coercion
was made based on the successful result.
However consider the implications if the programmer accidentally gets the
branches in the wrong order; that is:
...
if verify_signature(data, sig) then
handle_wrong_signature(data, sig)
else
handle_event(trust data)
According to the compiler this program would still be safe, because due to the
presence of the trust cast the check assertion still succeeds, even though the
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actual verification procedure would have failed.
The approach we take is based on this, but removes the control from the
hands of the programmer and places it solely with the verification procedure
used. The results of the verification are used to both apply the coercion (to
‘trusted’ if the integrity can be guaranteed, to ‘untrusted’ otherwise), and to
decide the direction of the branch. In other words, it encapsulates all the
elements of the correct code in example 3.1 in a single operation so it cannot
possibly be mis-applied.
Our complete syntax incorporating the new construct then becomes (def-
inition 3.2):
Definition 3.2
P ::= . . . | x(U) ?certifyP:Q
3.1 Semantics of certify
First define the following extra judgement form:
Definition 3.3 Write the following
Γ `C²certify K : T
to indicate that under the verification scheme named certify the process or
variable K has trustedness T. Similarly if K is untrusted under certify.
We are now in a position to specify the reduction semantics of the certify
construct, in the form of an additional two reduction rules:
Γ `C²certify K : T
. . .+ x[K].R|x(U) ?certifyP:Q + . . .→ R|P{K/U}
and the dual
Γ `C²certify K : U
. . .+ x[K].R|x(U) ?certifyP:Q + . . .→ R|Q{K/U}
By way of informal explanation, the new construct behaves like an input
process, binding the (single) input to U in P if it is found to be trusted, and
to U in Q if found to be untrusted. Note that the details of the certification
procedure used are unspecified; by deliberately abstracting in this way it be-
comes a framework capable of incorporating any method able to determine
the integrity of data or code. We note — this will become clearer when we
examine the type rules in section 4 — that this removes the possibility for
error demonstrated in example 3.1 as the type system will detect any instance
of an untrusted variable being used in a trusted environment.
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4 The Type System
The complete type rules are shown in figure 1. Many rules contain a term
of the form C1,C2 in the consequent. We use this as a form of syntactic
shorthand; recalling definition 2.12 this is in fact only defined if C1 ³ C2:
such rules should be read as containing the clause C1 ³ C2 in the antecedent
and either C1,C2 or C1 ∪ C2 in the consequent.
x : σb `C² x : σb; ∅ (var − 1 .) X : []b `C² X : []b;X : b (var − 2 .)
∅ `C² 0 : []b; ∅ (zero.)
Γ `C² A : σb;C
Γ, U : σc1 `C² A : σb;C
(weak .)
Γ `C² P : []b;C
Γ `C² !P : []b;C (repl .)
Γ `C² P : []b;C1 Γ `C² Q : []c;C2
Γ `C² P|Q : []
V
x∈C²(C1,C2)T (x);C1,C2
(comp.)
Γ `C² P : []b;C
ΓU `C² (νU)P : []b;CU (res .)
Γ `C² P : []b;C1 Γ `C² Q : []b;C2
Γ `C² P + Q : []b;C1,C2 (sum.)
Γ, x : (b · ~σc)b, ~U : b · ~σc `C² P : []d;C ∀U ∈ ~U.d = C(U)
Γ~U , x : (b · ~σc)b `C² x(~U).P : []d;C~U , x : d
(inp.)
Γ, x : (bc · ~σd)b `C² P : []c;C1 Γ, x : (bc · ~σd)b `C² ~K : bc · ~σd;C2
Γx, x : (bc · ~σd)b `C² x[ ~K].P : []c;C1, x : c,C2,FV
(
~K
)
: c
(out .)
Γ, x : (σb)d, U : σT `C² P : []c;C1 C1(U) = c
Γ, x : (σb)d, U : σU `C² Q : []c;C2 C2(U) = c
ΓU , x : (σ
b)d `C² x(U) ?certifyP:Q : []c;C1U ,C2U , x : c
(cert .)
Γ `C² P : []b;C
Γ `C² P : []
V
x∈C²C(x)
(final)
Fig. 1. Type Rules
Some explanation follows: several of the rules are fairly standard and rel-
atively unchanged from their un-annotated versions [20]. A null process can
be given any trust value for the purposes of a deduction, however because it
does nothing it has an empty context (note that because of this in a com-
plete deduction — one ending with the final rule — even an untrusted null
process would still be trusted overall; a logical outcome due to its inactivity.
See example 4.2). We require separate variable axioms; because a variable is
a process it has a context (of its own annotation) associated with it, while
a name does not. Weakening is allowed, although note that no additional
information is added to the context which is entirely dependent on the term.
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Replication does not change the typing; while restriction, being a binding op-
eration, removes the bound name or variable from both the assumption set
and the context. Summation (choice) is permitted so long as the types match
and a union can be formed between their respective contexts. The requirement
on the types (annotations) matching is due to the intuition that in a choice
construct we do not know which will reduce (discarding the alternatives), so
it is desirable that no matter which is chosen it has the same type.
Other rules require closer attention. The overall trustedness in a compo-
sition construction is determined by the possibility for interaction with the
external environment of both processes (the construct
V
x∈C²C(x)); as is the fi-
nal rule, which also drops the context as it is no longer required (since it is
always the final rule in a deduction).
The input rule requires that, to enforce policies on arities and types carried,
the types of names being input match the types carried by the input channel;
with the additional requirement that the types carried must be multiplied by
the trustedness of the channel. That is, since T is the multiplicative identity
a trusted channel can carry values of all trustedness, but because b · U =
U all data carried by an untrusted channel must be considered untrusted;
matching our intuition. There is an additional requirement on the input; that
all names being bound appear in a context of the same trustedness as the
overall trustedness of the process. This prevents the situation in which a
name in an untrusted context, in an otherwise-trusted process, is bound to
a name that can communicate with the environment and thus corrupts the
process (it might appear that a context at least as safe would suffice and
be more flexible, that is C(U) ≥ c; however this breaks our subject reduction
property, presented in section 6.2). The output rule similarly requires that the
types of the output data match those carried by the channel, with a similar
requirement that their trustedness be multiplied by the trustedness of the
channel. Unlike the input case however, there is an additional multiplication
by the trustedness of the sending process ; this ensures that all data sent by an
untrusted process is itself untrusted, even if transmitted on a trusted channel.
The certify rule takes two processes, one constructed using a trusted vari-
able, the other an identically-named untrusted variable. If the input data is
found to be trusted it is bound to a trusted variable in P, otherwise to an
untrusted variable in Q. Because it is a binding (on U) construct, information
concerning U is removed from the contexts and assumption sets. There is also
a requirement similar to the input rule that the name/variable being bound
is in a context the same as the overall trustedness.
Example 4.1 In example 3.1 we presented an example from a different sys-
tem and outlined our reservations; notably that a simple programmer error
could have dangerous safety repercussions with no warning from the com-
piler. Here we briefly illustrate how equivalent code might look in our sys-
tem, and how the type system prevents a similar form of error from occurring.
If we assume the data to be tested is received along a channel x (replacing
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read from network), then for some overall trustedness b we have
Γ `C² x(U) ?certifyhandleData:Err : []b;C
We note first of all that through the modularity of the certify framework we
do not explicitly mention the use of a signature to determine trustedness; it
may just as well be determined through use of code analysis for example. The
second, and most important benefit of our system is apparent when we consider
the antecedents to the above deduction:
Γ, x : (σc)d, U : σT `C² handleData : []b;C1
Γ, x : (σc)d, U : σU `C² Err : []b;C2
(where C = x : b,C1,C2) In other words, the certify deduction cannot be
formed if the branches are confused, as the bound variable must be trusted in
the first branch, and untrusted in the second.
The final rule in any complete deduction is the final rule; similarly to the com-
position rule, it combines the information collected in the contexts with the
environmental information contained in the external context to compute the
overall trustedness of a process. Because it is the final rule in any deduction,
the contextual information can be discarded.
Example 4.2 Consider the deduction Γ `C² 0 : []U; ∅, which holds for any
Γ (through repeated application of the variable rules). A null process can be
given any trustedness value for the purposes of a deduction; however under
the final rule it can have only one value:
Γ `C² 0 : []T
since
V
x∈C²C(x) = T for all C² when C = ∅; a logical result since a null process
— by virtue of being inactive — cannot corrupt the environment.
Another example, illustrating a malicious but impotent agent in the network:
Example 4.3 Consider a trusted agent P (and assume for simplicity that P
has no free names); then it is easy to verify that the following deduction is
valid: Γ `C² x.P : []T;x : T. We can similarly derive an untrusted (and also
closed) agent Γ `C² Q : []U;C, and hence Γ `C² y.Q : []U; y : U. If the two
co-exist in the same environment, and the only port of communication with
the environment is x (that is, C² = x) the following is easy to verify:
Γ `C² x.P|y.Q : []T
A third, slightly similar but more complicated example showing how a dan-
gerous agent is detected by the type system:
Example 4.4 We again assume a trusted and closed agent P, but this time
with a slightly more complicated sequence of (possible) communications added:
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Γ `C² x(v).z[v].P : []T;x : T, z : T. Again, assume an untrusted agent with the
following typing: Γ `C² y[w].Q : []U; y : U, w : U. With the port of observation
(C²) again x, it is easy to verify that no possibility for corruption exists:
Γ `C² x(v).z[v].P | y[w].Q : []T
However, if a third agent is introduced into the system the situation changes:
given Γ `C² z(v).y(w).R : []b; z : b, y : b there is now no valid typing that will
allow the three to run in parallel. To confirm this, recall from the composition
rule that we must be able to form the union of the individual contexts; there
is no b such that {x : T, z : T, v : T} ³ {z : b, y : b} ³ {y : U, w : U}
is defined since we must have both b = T and b = U. This confirms our
motivation (described in section 2.4) that because the untrusted process now
has a potential avenue of communication — albeit indirect — with the external
environment the entire group must be considered untrusted.
Example 4.5 As one final example, we examine the subtleties involved in a
higher-order example; sending a process. First of all note that the trustedness
of a name and its contextual trustedness are not necessarily the same; a name
may itself be untrusted but only appear in a trusted context. The following
scenario, that of a remote host sending an agent to be executed by a local host,
provides a realistic yet easy to follow framework for analysis:
x(X). (host | X) | x[agent ].remote
We note a few possible (and rejected) typings for such a situation. First of all,
both parties must have the same trustedness in order to be able to communicate;
this is as a consequence of having to form the union of the respective contexts,
which can only occur if x has the same contextual value. Secondly, even if both
agents are trusted, the channel of communication between them can itself be
untrusted; all data transmitted would also be untrusted. Closer examination of
this point however reveals that although trusted processes can send untrusted
names, they cannot in most (useful) cases send untrusted agents. To see why
this is the case consider the construction of the output rule, and in particular
the requirements on the contexts. Because the argument must be multiplied by
the trustedness of both the sending process and the channel, “agent” must be
untrusted if x is too. This means that in the deduction Γ `C² agent : []U;Ca
most names in the domain of Ca will have a value of U; however the output
role requires that all values in the range of Ca have the same trustedness as
that of “remote” (in this case T) so such a process cannot be typed under those
conditions. This is perhaps a little restrictive; however it is certainly the safest
option as it prevents a potentially corrupted process from becoming a conduit as
it in example 4.4. We suspect that the introduction of subtyping (see section 7.2
for possibilities) might allow a little more flexibility. In summary though, when
processes are sending agents (names are not affected) the trustedness of the
channel must be the same as that of the sending process.
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5 Implementation
5.1 Unification
Numerous unification algorithms will be needed to handle the different com-
binations of base types and annotations present, although they all share a
common structure. We begin by defining substitutions:
Definition 5.1
• A substitution is a pair
(ST : Type→ Type,RB : boolexp→ boolexp).
• Usually written just as S; sometimes write R to denote (Id,RB).
• Write Id for (Id, Id).
• Write S1;S2 for S2 ◦ S1 (that is; S1;S2(σb) ≡ S2(S1(σb)))
• Application: if S = (ST ,RB) then
· S(σb) = ST ;RB(σb)
· S((σb1 . . . σcn)d) = (S(σb1) . . . S(σcn))S(d)
• Given S = (ST ,RB), write S[αi := Sj] for (ST [αi := Sj],RB) and S[i := j]
for (ST ,RB[i := j]). Similarly, write S;R for (ST ,RB;R).
The following two algorithms are the most important, unifying boolean
annotations and types (which include boolean annotations) respectively. The
remainder exploit the first two (5.2 and 5.3) to work over sets.
Definition 5.2 BUNIFY is the boolean unifier [7] that returns the most gen-
eral unifier of its arguments if one exists, or it fails.
Definition 5.3 U is the most general unifier of a pair of types, see for example
Huet [6]. It uses BUNIFY to unify the annotations:
U(αb, σc)= if α ∈ σ ∧ α 6= σ then ⊥ else
let S = Id[α := σ] in S; BUNIFY(b, c)
U(σc, αb)=U(αb, σc)
U(( ~σc)b, ( ~σe)d)= if length( ~σc) 6= length( ~σe) then ⊥ else
let R = BUNIFY(b, d) in R;U(R( ~σc),R( ~σe))
U(σb ~σc, σd ~σe)= if length( ~σc) 6= length( ~σe) then ⊥ else
let S = U(σb, σd) in S;U(S( ~σc), S( ~σe))
U([]b, []c)=BUNIFY(b, c)
Definition 5.4 Unify unifies two assumption sets, by unifying the types of
all names present in both arguments:
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Unify(Γ1,Γ2), Id (domΓ1 ∩ domΓ2 = ∅)
Unify
({x : σb1} ∪ Γ1, {x : σc2} ∪ Γ2), S; Unify(S(Γ1),S(Γ2))
where S = U(σb1, σc2)
Definition 5.5 CUnify unifies two contexts, by unifying the mappings of all
names present in both arguments:
CUnify(C1,C2), Id (domC1 ∩ domC2 = ∅)
CUnify({x : b} ∪ C1, {x : c} ∪ C2),R; CUnify(R(C1),R(C2))
where R = BUNIFY(b, c)
Finally, enforcing the multiplication constraint required by some type rules
is implemented by the following algorithm:
Definition 5.6
M
(
b, σT
)
=BUNIFY(b,T)
M
(
b, σU
)
=Id
M(b, σc)=BUNIFY(c, b · i)
M
(
b, σc ~σ′e
)
= let S =M(b, σc)
in S;M
(
S(b), S( ~σ′e)
)
5.2 The Type Inference Algorithm
The complete type inference algorithm is split over figures 2 and 3. The
auxiliary algorithm of figure 4 is used to unify lists of processes or names,
such as those that may be found as the “arguments” of an output.
6 Safety
There are two main components we wish to prove in demonstrating the safety
and correctness of our system; that subject reduction holds for the type sys-
tem, and that the algorithm is sound and correct.
6.1 Properties of Contexts
First we need the following properties of contexts (proofs are all by induction):
Lemma 6.1 (Context Subset)
∀C′ ⊆ C.
∧
x ∈ C²C(x) ≤
∧
x ∈ C²C
′
T (x)
Proof. Let ~y be the sequence of names given by C² ∩ domC. Then since
C′ ⊆ C the sequence ~y′ = C² ∩ domC′ is a subsequence of ~y, and hence by
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TypeC²pi (0)=
〈∅, ∅, []i〉
TypeC²pi (x)=
〈{x : αi}, ∅, αi〉
TypeC²pi (X)=
〈{X : []i}, {X : i}, []i〉
TypeC²pi (!P)=Type
C²
pi (P)
TypeC²pi ((νU)P)= let
〈
Γ,C, []b
〉
= TypeC²pi (P)
in
〈
ΓU ,CU , []b
〉
TypeC²pi (P + Q)= let
〈
Γ1,C1, []b
〉
= TypeC²pi (P)
〈Γ2,C2, []c〉 = TypeC²pi (Q)
R = BUNIFY(b, c)
S1 = R; Unify(R(Γ1),R(Γ2))
S2 = S1; CUnify(S1(C1),S1(C2))
in
〈
S2(Γ1 ∪ Γ2),S2(C1 ∪ C2), []S2(b)
〉
TypeC²pi (P|Q)= let
〈
Γ1,C1, []b
〉
= TypeC²pi (P)
〈Γ2,C2, []c〉 = TypeC²pi (Q)
S1 = Unify(Γ1,Γ2)
S2 = S1; CUnify(S1(C1),S1(C2))
C = S2(C1 ∪ C2)
in
〈
S2(Γ1 ∪ Γ2),C, []
V
x∈C²C(x)
〉
TypeC²pi
(
x(~U).P
)
= let
〈
Γ,C, []b
〉
= TypeC²pi (P)
S1 = Unify
(
Γ, {x : (~αi)j, ~U : ~αi}
)
S2 = S1;M
(
S1(j),S1((~αi)j)
)
S3 = S2; CUnify(S2(C),S2({x : b}))
in
〈
S3(Γ~U ∪ {x : (~αi)j}),S3(C~U ∪ {x : b}), []S3(b)
〉
Fig. 2. Type Inference Algorithm
definition
V
x∈C²C(x) ≤
V
x∈C²C
′
T (x). (since ∀b, c.b ·c ≤ c, and where
V
x∈C²C(x) andV
x∈C²C
′
T (x) are the sequences
∧~b and ∧ ~b′, corresponding to the mappings of
~y and ~y′ in C and C′ respectively).
Lemma 6.2 (Context Expansion) Let C′ = C, y : b where C is any context
such that y /∈ domC, then
∀C, b, y /∈ domC.b ≤
∧
x ∈ C²C(x)⇒ b ≤
∧
x ∈ C²C
′
T (x)
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TypeC²pi
(
x[ ~K].P
)
= let
〈
Γ1,C1, []b
〉
= TypeC²pi (P)〈
Γ2,C2, ~σc
〉
= ∗TypeC²pi
(
~K
)
S1 = Unify(Γ1,Γ2)
S2 = S1;M
(
S1(b),S1( ~σc)
)
S3 = S2;M
(
S2(i), S2(( ~σc)i)
)
S4 = S3; Unify
(
S3(Γ1 ∪ Γ2),S3({x : ( ~σc)i})
)
S5 = S4; CUnify
(
S4(C2),S4(FV
(
~K
)
: b, x : b)
)
S6 = S5; CUnify
(
S5(C1),S5(FV
(
~K
)
: b, x : b)
)
in
〈
S6(Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ {x : ( ~σc)i),
S6(C1 ∪ {FV
(
~K
)
: b} ∪ {x : b}), []S6(b)
〉
TypeC²pi (x(U) ?certifyP:Q)= let
〈
Γ1,C1, []b
〉
= TypeC²pi (P)
〈Γ2,C2, []c〉 = TypeC²pi (Q)
S1 = Unify
(
Γ1, {U : αT}
)
S2 = S1; Unify
(
S1(Γ2), {U : S1(αU)}
)
S3 = S2; Unify(S2(Γ1U), S2(Γ2U))
S4 = S3; Unify
(
S3(Γ1U ∪ Γ2U),S3({x : (αi)j})
)
S5 = S4; CUnify(S4(C1U),S4(C2U))
S6 = S5; CUnify(S5(C1U ,C2U),S5(x : b))
S7 = S6; BUNIFY(S6(b),S6(c))
in
〈
S7(Γ1U ∪ Γ2U ∪ {x : (αi)j}),
S7(C1U ∪ C2U ∪ {x : b}), []S7(b)
〉
Fig. 3. Type Inference Algorithm (continued)
∗TypeC²pi (K)=TypeC²pi (K)
∗TypeC²pi
(
K ~K ′
)
= let
〈
Γ1,C1, σb1
〉
= TypeC²pi (K)〈
Γ2,C2, ~σc2
〉
= ∗TypeC²pi
(
~K ′
)
S1 = Unify(Γ1,Γ2)
S2 = S1; CUnify(S1(C1), S1(C2))
in
〈
S2(Γ1 ∪ Γ2), S2(C1 ∪ C2), S2(σb1 ~σc2)
〉
Fig. 4. Type Inference Algorithm for Multiple Processes
20
Hepburn and Wright
Proof. Let
V
x∈C²C(x) = c (and from the statement, b ≤ c). Then given
C′ = C, y : b (y /∈ domC) we have
∧
x ∈ C²C
′
T (x) =
 c, if y /∈ C²b · c, if y ∈ C²
and since b ≤ c⇒ b = b · c we have b ≤
V
x∈C²C
′
T (x) as required.
The next corollary follows straight-forwardly from the previous result:
Corollary 6.3
∃b.∀C, y /∈ domC, c ≥ b.b =
∧
x ∈ C²C(x)⇒ b =
∧
x ∈ C²C
′
T (x)
where C′ = C, y : c.
Lemma 6.4 (Context Join)
b ≤
∧
x ∈ C²C1T (x), b ≤
∧
x ∈ C²C2T (x)⇒ b ≤
∧
x ∈ C²(C1,C2)T (x)
Proof. By definition of the comma operator and straightforward induction
on the contents of C1, C2.
The following is a direct result of the output type rule:
Fact 6.5 (Output Context)
Γ `C² x[ ~K].P : []b;C⇒ ∀y ∈ FV
(
~K
)
.C(y) = b
Lemma 6.6 (Context Annotation)
Γ `C² P : []b;C⇒ b ≤
∧
x ∈ C²C(x)
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ `C² P : []b;C.
• Γ `C² P : []b;C: Trivial.
• Γ `C² !P : []b;C: By the induction hypothesis.
• ΓU `C² (νU)Q : []b;C: By the induction hypothesis the lemma holds for
Q; i.e. Γ `C² Q : []b;C ⇒ b ≤
V
x∈C²C(x). They by the restriction type rule
we have ΓU `C² Q : []b;CU . Then we have CU ⊆ C and so by the context
subset lemma (6.1)
V
x∈C²C(x) ≤
V
x∈C²CUT (x) and hence b ≤
V
x∈C²CUT (x).
• Γ `C² Q|R : []b;C: By definition; the composition type rule states that
Γ `C² Q|R : []b;C where b =
V
x∈C²C(x).
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• Γ `C² Q + R : []b;C: By the induction hypothesis the lemma holds for Q
and R individually; i.e. Γ `C² Q : []b;C1 ⇒ b ≤
V
x∈C²C1U(x) and Γ `C²
R : []b;C2 ⇒ b ≤
V
x∈C²C2U(x). Hence by the summation type rule and the
context join lemma (6.4) Γ `C² Q+R : []b;C1,C2 ⇒ b ≤
V
x∈C²(C1,C2)T (x).
• Γ `C² x(~U).Q : []b;C: By the induction hypothesis and the input type rule
Γ `C² Q : []b;C ⇒ b ≤
V
x∈C²C(x). Then by the input type rule we have
Γ~U `C² x(~U).Q : []b;C~U , x : b and so by the context subset lemma (6.1) and
the context expansion lemma (6.2) b ≤
V
x∈C²(C~U , x : b)T (x).
• Γ `C² x[ ~K].Q : []b;C: By the induction hypothesis and the output type
rule Γ `C² Q : []b;C ⇒ b ≤
V
x∈C²C(x). Then by the output type rule
we get Γ `C² x[ ~K].Q : []b;C,FV
(
~K
)
: b, x : b and hence by the context
expansion lemma (6.2) and output context fact (6.5) b ≤
V
x∈C²C
′
T (x) where
C′ = C,FV
(
~K
)
: b, x : b.
• Γ `C² x(U) ?certifyQ:R : []b;C: By the induction hypothesis, the lemma holds
individually:
Γ, x : (σc)d, U : σT `C² Q : []b;C1⇒ b ≤
∧
x ∈ C²C1T (x)
Γ, x : (σc)d, U : σU `C² R : []b;C2⇒ b ≤
∧
x ∈ C²C2T (x)
then by the certify type rule Γ `C² x(U) ?certifyQ:R : []b;C1,C2, x : b; and so
by the context expansion lemma (6.2) and the context join lemma (6.4)
b ≤
V
x∈C²C(x) where C = C1,C2, x : b.
Finally, we will need a boolean substitution defined on the reduction path:
Definition 6.7 See figure 5 for a full definition; we sketch the general result
here. Given the following:
P→ P′ °Γcertify R
Then R is a boolean substitution representing exactly every coercion involved in
the reduction path. It is defined by induction on the reduction path, and would
be the identity substitution in a reduction not involving any certify constructs.
6.2 Subject Reduction
Now we are in a position to formulate our subject reduction statement, starting
with a substitution lemma:
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P→ P °Γcertify Id
(reflex .)
x[ ~K].P
x[ ~K]−−→ P °Γcertify Id
(out .)
P→ P′ °Γcertify R
P + Q→ P′ °Γcertify R
(sum.)
x(~U).P
x( ~K)−−−→ P{ ~K/~U} °Γcertify Id
(inp.)
P→ P′ °Γcertify R1 Q→ Q′ °Γcertify R2
P|Q→ P′|Q′ °Γcertify R1;R2
(comp.)
P→ P′ °Γcertify R1 P′ → P′′ °Γcertify R2
P→ P′′ °Γcertify R1;R2
(trans .)
Γ `C² K : σi;C Γ `C²certify K : T
x(U) ?certifyP:Q
x(K)−−−→ P{K/U} °Γcertify Id[i := T]
(cert − T)
Γ `C² K : σi;C Γ `C²certify K : U
x(U) ?certifyP:Q
x(K)−−−→ Q{K/U} °Γcertify Id[i := U]
(cert − U)
Fig. 5. Reduction Substitution Relation
Lemma 6.8 (Substitution Lemma) ∃C′2 ⊇ C2.
ΓU , U : σ
c `C² P : σb1;C1 ΓU `C² K : σc;C2
∀V ∈ FV (K) .(C1,C2)(V ) = C1(U) C1(U) = b
ΓU `C² P{K/U} : σb1;C1U ,C′2
We make two extra requirements than the usual statement, to cater for the
extra information provided by the contexts. As with the input rule we require
that the variable being substituted appears in a context at least as safe as the
overall trustedness, and we also require that every free variable in the new
name (process) appears in a context identical to the substitution variable.
The proof of subject reduction — which requires the substitution lemma —
reveals that every substitution which occurs due to a reduction does indeed
appear in such a situation.
Proof. By induction on the structure of P and the in certain cases on the
type of U and K.
• P ≡ 0: Trivial.
• P ≡ X: Trivial; by definition. Note that by the statement, ΓX , X :
[]b `C² X : []b;C1 where C1 = X : b, and ΓX `C² K : []b;C2 where
∀V ∈ FV (K) .C2(V ) = C1(X) = b (and b ≥ b by definition). Then by
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the definition of substitution we have ΓX `C² K : []b;C1X ,C′2 as required
(where C1X = ∅ and C′2 = C2).
• P ≡ !P′: By definition ΓU , U : σc `C² !P′ : []b;C1 and hence by the repli-
cation type rule ΓU , U : σ
c `C² P′ : []b;C1. By the induction hypoth-
esis the lemma holds for P′, i.e. given ΓU `C² K : σc;C2 where ∀V ∈
FV (K) .(C1,C2)(V ) = C1(U) and C1(U) ≥ b, then ΓU `C² P′{K/U} :
[]b;C1U ,C′2 (with C2 ⊆ C′2). Hence by the replication type rule we have
ΓU `C² !P′{K/U} : []b;C1U ,C′2 as required.
• P ≡ (νV )P′: By definition ΓUV , U : σc `C² (νV )P′ : []b;C1V and hence by
the restriction type rule ΓU , U : σ
c, V : σd1 `C² P′ : []b;C1. By the induction
hypothesis the lemma holds for P′, i.e. given ΓU `C² K : σc;C2 (note that
since we are assuming capture-avoiding substitutions, i.e. that all bound
names are renamed to be distinct, we don’t need to consider the restricted
variable V in the deduction ofK) where ∀V ∈ FV (K) .(C1,C2)(V ) = C1(U)
and C1(U) ≥ b, then ΓU , V : σd1 `C² P′{K/U} : []b;C1U ,C′2 (with C2 ⊆
C′2). Hence by the restriction type rule we have ΓU `C² (νV )P′{K/U} :
[]b;C1UV ,C′2V as required.
• P ≡ P′ +Q: By definition, Γ `C² P′ +Q : []b;C and hence by the summa-
tion type rule, ΓU , U : σ
c `C² P′ : []b;C1 and ΓU , U : σc `C² Q : []b;C2
where C = C1,C2. By the induction hypothesis, the lemma holds for
both P′ and Q, i.e. given ΓU `C² K : σc;C3 we have ΓU `C² P′{K/U} :
[]b;C1U ,C′3 and ΓU `C² Q{K/U} : []b;C2U ,C′′3. Then by the summation
type rule and the definition of substitution we have ΓU `C² (P′ +Q){K/U} :
[]b;C1U ,C2U ,C′3,C′′3 as required.
• P ≡ P′|Q: By definition, ΓU , U : σc `C² P′|Q : []b;C and hence by the
composition type rule we have ΓU , U : σ
c `C² P′ : []b1 ;C1 and ΓU , U :
σc `C² Q : []b2 ;C2 where C = C1,C2 and b =
V
x∈C²C(x). By the induction
hypothesis the lemma holds for P′ and Q individually; i.e. ΓU `C² P′{K/U} :
[]b1 ;C1U ,C′3 and ΓU `C² Q{K/U} : []b2 ;C2U ,C′′3 given that ΓU `C² K :
σc;C3 and ∀V ∈ FV (K) .(Ci,C3)(V ) = C1(U) and C1(U) ≥ b, i = 1, 2
(where as required C3 ⊆ C′3 and C3 ⊆ C′′3). Then by the composition type
rule and the definition of substitution ΓU `C² (P′|Q) {K/U} : []b;C′ where
C′ = C1U ,C2U ,C′3,C′′3 and b =
V
x∈C²C
′
T (x) by the corollary to the context
expansion lemma.
• P ≡ x′(~V ).P′: By definition ΓU ~V , U : σc, x : (b· ~σd1)b `C² x(~V ).P′ : []e;C1~V , x :
e and hence by the input type rule ΓU ~V , U : σ
c, x : (b · ~σd1)b, ~V : b · ~σd1 `C²
P′ : []e;C1 (where ∀V ∈ ~V .C1(V ) ≥ e). By the induction hypothesis the
lemma holds for P′, i.e. given ΓU ~V , x : (b · ~σd1)b `C² K : σc;C2 then ΓU ~V , x :
(b · ~σd1)b, ~V : b · ~σd1 `C² P′{K/U} : []e;C1U ,C′2 with C′2 ⊇ C2. (note that if
U ∈ ~V then lemma holds by renaming of bound variables). Now depending
on whether U is a variable or a name:
· U ≡ x: Then by the type rules Γx~V , x : (b· ~σd1)b, ~V : b· ~σd1 `C² P′ : []e;C1 and
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by the definition of substitution (assuming K ≡ y), Γx~V , y : (b · ~σd1)b, ~V :
b · ~σd1 `C² P′{y/x} : []e;C1~V x,C′2 where C′2 ⊇ C2 and hence Γx~V , y : (b ·
~σd1)
b `C² y(~V ).P′{y/x} : []e;C1~V x, y : e where C′2 = y : e ⊇ C2 = ∅ as
required.
· U ≡ X, K ≡ Q: no further substitution required; i.e. assuming that X /∈
~V then by the type rules ΓU ~V , x : (b· ~σd1)b `C² x(~V ).P′{K/U} : []e;C1U ~V ,C′2
as before.
• P ≡ x[ ~J ].P′: By definition, ΓU , x : (bc · ~σd1)b, U : σe `C² x[ ~J ].P′ : []c;C1 with
ΓU , U : σ
e, x : (c · ~σd1)b `C² ~J : c · ~σd1 ;C2 and hence by the output type rule
ΓU , U : σ
e, x : (c · ~σd1)b `C² P′ : []c;C′1 (where C1 = C′1,C2, x : c,FV
(
~J
)
: c).
By the induction hypothesis the lemma holds for P′, i.e. ΓU , x : (c · ~σd1)b `C²
P′{K/U} : []c;C′1U ,C′3 given ΓU , x : (c · ~σd1)b `C² K : σe;C3 with C3 ⊆ C′3.
Then by the output type rule we have ΓU , x : (bc · ~σd1)b `C² x[ ~J ].P′{K/U} :
[]c;C′1U , x : c,C′′3. Similarly if U ≡ x and K ≡ y.
• P ≡ x(V ) ?certifyP′:Q: By definition, ΓU , U : σb `C² x(V ) ?certifyP′:Q : []c;C and
hence by the certify type rule we have ΓU , x : (σ
d
1)
e, U : σb, V : σT1 `C²
P′ : []c;C1 and ΓU , x : (σd1)e, U : σb, V : σU1 `C² Q : []c;C2 where C =
C1V ,C2V , x : c. By the induction hypothesis, lemma holds for antecedents;
i.e. given ΓU , x : (σ
d
1)
e `C² K : σb;C3 we have ΓU , x : (σd1)e, V : σT1 `C²
P′{K/U} : []c;C1U ,C′3 and ΓU , x : (σd1)e, V : σU1 `C² Q{K/U} : []c;C1U ,C′′3
where ∀V ∈ FV (K) .(Ci,C3)(V ) = C(U) and C(U) ≥ b, i = 1, 2 (where as
required C3 ⊆ C′3 and C3 ⊆ C′′3). Hence by the certify type rule and the
definition of substitution we have ΓU , x : (σ
d
1)
e `C² (x(V ) ?certifyP′:Q){K/U} :
[]c;C1U ,C2UC′3,C′′3, x : c as required.
Finally,the subject reduction theorem:
Theorem 6.9 (Subject Reduction) ∃c ≥ b,C′ ⊆ C.
Γ `C² P : []b;C P→ P′ °Γcertify R
R(Γ) `C² P′ : []R(c);R(C′)
Again, there are a few subtle differences with the usual statement. The most
important difference relates to the possibility of run-time coercion occurring
during a reduction; this means the same assumption set cannot be used after
the reduction, as the type annotations may be slightly different; to express
this we include a boolean substitution — tightly defined by the reduction path
— and apply that to the assumption set in the consequent.
Secondly, note that as names may expire in a reduction the context after
a reduction is going to be a subset of the context before a reduction — hence
by lemma 6.1 the trustedness of a process after a reduction will be at least as
safe as it was before the reduction.
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Proof. By induction on the derivation of P → P′, and by cases on the
structure of P.
(i) Reflex: (P→ P). Trivial.
(ii) Communication Reduction:
We proceed by considering the parts of the reduction in turn, that is
x[ ~K].Q
x[ ~K]−−→ Q′ and x(~U).R x( ~K)−−−→ R′{ ~K/~U}, then considering the com-
bination (note that subject reduction does not hold for the input re-
dex in isolation; it must be considered within the context of the com-
plete communication reduction). From the statement we have Γ `C²
x[ ~K].Q|x(~U).R : []b;C. Hence Γ `C² x[ ~K].Q : []b1 ;C1 and Γ `C² x(~U).R :
[]b2 ;C2 by the composition type rule, where C = C1,C2 and b =
V
x∈C²C(x).
• Firstly, consider the output case: by the output rule we have Γ `C²
Q : []b1 ;C′1 where C′1 ⊆ C1 as follows: if x,FV
(
~K
)
∈ FV (Q) then
C′1 = C1. Else if x /∈ FV (Q) then C′1 = C1x and hence C′1 ⊂ C1 (and
similarly ∀y ∈ FV
(
~K
)
). Therefore
R(Γ) `C² Q : []R(b1);R(C′1)
as required, where R = Id and b1 ≤ b1 by definition.
• Secondly, consider the input case: by the input type rule we have
Γ, ~U `C² R : []b2 ;C2,C′′ where C′′ is the subset of the names and vari-
ables ~U contained in FV (R). Then by the substitution lemma (6.8)
Γ `C² R{ ~K/~U} : []b2 ;C2,C′′′ where domC′′′ is the subset of FV
(
~K
)
substituted in R, and so R(Γ) `C² R{ ~K/~U} : []R(b2);R(C2,C′′′) where
R = Id.
Then considering the two cases together by the composition type rule we
have Γ `C² x[ ~K].Q : []b;C1,C2 and also
Γ `C² Q|R{ ~K/~U} : []c;C′1,C2,C′′′
noting that C1 = C′1,C′′′, x : b so C′1,C′′′ ⊆ C1 as required, and c ≥ b by
lemma 6.1 (context subset).
(iii) certify Contraction:
• Γ `C²certify K : σT:
Suppose the last rule used in the derivation of P→ P′ was
Γ `C²certify K : σT
x[K].R|x(U) ?certifyP:Q→ R|P{K/U}
From the statement, we have Γ `C² x[K].R|x(U) ?certifyP:Q : []c;C. Then
(firstly) by the composition rule we have Γ `C² x[K].R : []c1 ;C1 and
Γ `C² x(U) ?certifyP:Q : []c2 ;C2 where C = C1,C2 and c =
V
x∈C²C(x) by
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definition. Then similarly by reverse applications of the output and
certify rules we obtain:
Γ, x : (σb)d `C² K : σb;FV (K) : c1
Γ, x : (σb)d `C² R : []c1 ;C′1
Γ, x : (σb)d, U : σT `C² P : []c2 ;C′2
Γ, x : (σb)d, U : σU `C² Q : []c2 ;C′′2
noting that C2 = C′2,C′′2, x : c2 and C1 = C′1,FV (K) : c1, x : c1 (and
therefore c1 = c2; we will only refer to c1 from now on).
Now consider the antecedents (to the composition rule) in turn:
· x[K].R x[K]−−→ R ⇒ R1(Γ) `C² R : []R1(c1);R1(C′1) as required, where
R1 = Id and c1 ≤ c1 by definition.
· x(U) ?certifyP:Q x(K)−−−→ P{K/U} ⇒
R2(Γ) `C² P{K/U} : []R2(c1);R2(C′2U ,C′′′2 ) where C′′′ = FV (K) : c1 if
U ∈ FV (P ), or ∅ otherwise; c1 ≤ c1 by definition, and R2 = Id[b := T].
Then composing (i.e. the composition rule):
R(Γ) `C² R|P{K/U} : []R(c′);R(C1,C′2,C′′′2 )
where R = R1;R2 = R2 = Id[b := T], C1,C′2,C′′′2 ⊆ C = C1,C2 =
C′1,FV (K) : c1, x : c1,C′2,C′′2 and c′ =
V
x∈C²C(x) ≥ c by the context
subset lemma (6.1) as required.
• Γ `C²certify U : σU: Similarly.
(iv) Sub.:
• Suppose the last rule used in the derivation was
Q→ Q′
P = !Q→ !Q|Q′ = P′
From the statement we have Γ `C² !Q : []b;C, and hence by the repli-
cation type rule Γ `C² Q : []b;C. Then by the induction hypothesis
R(Γ) `C² Q′ : []R(c);R(C′) where C′ ⊆ C and b ≤ c. Hence by the
composition type rule R(Γ) `C² !Q|Q′ : []R(b);R(C) as required. (Note
that since C′ ⊆ C then by definition C,C′ = C).
• Suppose the last rule used in the derivation of P→ P′ was
Q
ω−→ Q′
P = (νU)Q
ω−→ (νU)Q′ = P′ (U /∈ FV (ω))
By the statement we have ΓU `C² (νU)Q : []b;CU , so by the restriction
type rule we have Γ `C² Q : []b;C. Therefore by the induction hypothe-
sis R(Γ) `C² Q′ : []R(c);C′ with C′ ⊆ C and b ≤ c, and hence by the type
rules we have R(ΓU) `C² (νU)Q′ : []R(b);C′U where Q → Q °Γcertify R by
definition.
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• Suppose P ≡ Q+R and the last rule used in the derivation of P→ P′
was
Q→ Q′
P = Q+ R→ Q′ = P′
From the statement we have Γ `C² Q+R : []b;C, so by the summation
type rule we have Γ `C² Q : []b;C1 and Γ `C² R : []b;C2 (where C =
C1,C2). Therefore by the induction hypothesis,
R(Γ) `C² Q′ : []R(b);R(C′1)
where Q → Q′ °Γcertify R by the definition of °Γcertify, and C′1 ⊆ C by
definition.
•
Q→ Q′ R→ R′
P = Q|R→ Q′|R′ = P′
By the statement we have Γ `C² Q|R : []b;C, so by the composition
type rule Γ `C² Q : []b1 ;C1 and Γ `C² R : []b2 ;C2 where C = C1,C2 and
b =
V
x∈C²C(x). Then by the induction hypothesis we have R1(Γ) `C²
Q′ : []R1(c1);R1(C′1) and R2(Γ) `C² R′ : []R2(c2);R2(C′2) where b1 ≤ c1
and b2 ≤ c2, C′1 ⊆ C1 and C′2 ⊆ C2, and Q → Q′ °Γcertify R1 and
R→ R′ °Γcertify R2.
Then again by the composition rule we have
R(Γ) `C² Q′|R′ : []R(c);R(C′)
as required, where R = R1;R2 by definition of °Γcertify; C′ = C′1,C′2 and
c =
V
x∈C²C
′
T (x), with b ≤ c by the context subset lemma 6.1 (since given
C′1 ⊆ C1 and C′2 ⊆ C2, then C′ = C′1,C′2 ⊆ C1,C2 = C).
Corollary 6.10
∃c ≥ b
Γ `C² P : []b P→ P′ °Γcertify R
R(Γ) `C² P′ : []R(c)
Proof. The deduction Γ `C² P : []b ended in a use of the final rule, so by
lemma 6.6 (context annotation) we have Γ `C² P : []b′ ;C, where b′ ≤ b =V
x∈C²C(x). Then by subject reduction (theorem 6.9) we have R(Γ) `C² P′ :
[]R(c′);R(C′) where c′ ≥ b′. By lemma 6.6 again we have c =
V
x∈C²C
′
T (x) ≥ c′,
and by lemma 6.1 (context subset) C′ ⊂ C implies c ≥ b as required.
6.3 Correctness of the Implementation
Soundness means demonstrating that the algorithm returns a valid typing (if
one exists):
Theorem 6.11 (Soundness) If
〈
Γ,C, []b
〉
= TypeC²pi (P) is defined, then
Γ `C² P : []b;C.
28
Hepburn and Wright
Proof. By induction on the structure of P.
• P ≡ 0: By inspection, TypeC²pi (0) = 〈∅, ∅, []i〉 and by the zero type rule
∅ `C² 0 : []i; ∅ as required.
• P ≡ !P′: By inspection, TypeC²pi (!P′) = TypeC²pi (P′). By induction, if〈
Γ,C, []b
〉
= TypeC²pi (P′) then Γ `C² P′ : []b;C; hence by the replication
type rule and the definition of TypeC²pi
〈
Γ,C, []b
〉
= TypeC²pi (!P′) and Γ `C²
!P′ : []b;C as required.
• P ≡ (νU)P′: By the induction hypothesis soundness holds for P′; i.e. if〈
Γ,C, []b
〉
= TypeC²pi (P′) then Γ `C² P′ : []b;C. Then by inspection of
the algorithm soundness holds by the restriction type rule;
〈
ΓU ,CU , []b
〉
=
TypeC²pi (P′) and ΓU `C² P′ : []b;CU as required.
• P ≡ P′|Q: By the induction hypothesis soundness holds for P′ and Q
individually; i.e. TypeC²pi (P′) =
〈
Γ1,C1, []b
〉 ⇒ Γ1 `C² P′ : []b;C1 and
TypeC²pi (Q) = 〈Γ2,C2, []c〉 ⇒ Γ2 `C² Q : []c;C2. Then by soundness of Unify
and CUnify, if S1 = Unify(Γ1,Γ2) and S2 = S1; CUnify(S1(C1), S1(C2)) then
by the composition type rule and examination of the definition
TypeC²pi (P′|Q) =
〈
S2(Γ1 ∪ Γ2),S2(C), []S2(
V
x∈C²C(x))
〉
and S2(Γ1∪Γ2) `C² P′|Q :
[]S2(
V
x∈C²C(x));S2(C) as required, where C = C1,C2.
• P ≡ P′ +Q: Similarly, also invoking soundness of BUNIFY to unify anno-
tations as required by the type system (summation rule).
• P ≡ x(~U).P: By the induction hypothesis soundness holds for P; i.e.
TypeC²pi (P) =
〈
Γ,C, []b
〉 ⇒ Γ `C² P : []b;C. By the soundness of Unify,
S1 = Unify
(
Γ,
{
x : (~αi)j, ~U : ~αi
})
ensures that the types carried by x
match those of ~U , while S2 = S1;M
(
S1(j),S1((~αi)j)
)
ensures that the in-
put types are multiplied by the annotation of the input channel (as re-
quired by the input type rule) by the soundness of M and by the sound-
ness of CUnify, S3 = S2; CUnify(S2(C),S2({x : b})) ensures that C, x : b
can be formed (as required). Then by the type rules TypeC²pi
(
x(~U).P
)
=〈
S2(Γ~U ∪ {x : (~αi)j}), S2(C~U , x : b), []S2(b)
〉
and S2(Γ~U ∪ {x : (~αi)j}) `C²
x(~U).P : []S2(b);S2(C~U , x : b).
• P ≡ x[ ~K].P′: By the induction hypothesis soundness holds for P′, that
is
〈
Γ1,C1, []b
〉
= TypeC²pi (P′) being defined implies Γ1 `C² P′ : []b;C1.
By the soundness of ∗TypeC²pi , the following also holds:
〈
Γ2,C2, ~σc
〉
=
∗TypeC²pi
(
~K
)
⇒ Γ2 `C² ~K : ~σc;C2. Then by soundness of Unify, S1 =
Unify(Γ1,Γ) unifies the two assumption sets, and by soundness of M S2 =
S1;M
(
S1(b),S1( ~σc)
)
and S3 = S2;M
(
S2(i),S2(( ~σc)i)
)
ensures that the type
of ~K is multiplied by the trustedness of P′ and of x, as required. By
soundness of Unify again, S4 = S3; Unify
(
S3(Γ1 ∪ Γ2),S3({x : ( ~σc)i})
)
guar-
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antees that the type of x can carry names of type ~σc as required. By
soundness of CUnify, S5 = S4; CUnify
(
S4(C2),S4(FV
(
~K
)
: b, x : b)
)
and
S6 = S5; CUnify
(
S5(C1), S5(FV
(
~K
)
: b, x : b)
)
ensure the requirement in
the output type rule that we can form C1, x : b,C2,FV
(
~K
)
: b in the con-
sequent. Then by the type rules
TypeC²pi
(
x[ ~K].P′
)
=
〈
S5(Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ∪ S6({x : ( ~σc)i),
S5(C1 ∪ {FV
(
~K
)
: b} ∪ {x : b}), []S5(b)
〉
⇒ S5(Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ∪ S6({x : ( ~σc)i) `C²
x[ ~K].P′ : []S5(b);S5(C1 ∪ {FV
(
~K
)
: b} ∪ {x : b}) as required.
• P ≡ x(U) ?certifyP′:Q: By the induction hypothesis, soundness holds for P′
and Q individually; i.e. TypeC²pi (P) =
〈
Γ1,C1, []b
〉 ⇒ Γ1 `C² P : []b;C1 and
TypeC²pi (Q) = 〈Γ2,C2, []c〉 ⇒ Γ2 `C² Q : []c;C2. Then by the soundness of
Unify the type of U in P′ (if any) is unified with fresh variable α (with
annotation T and U respectively), and the assumption sets for P′ and Q
are also unified together (less the type for U , as this will have a different
annotation in each). Then (also by soundness of Unify) the type of x in the
combined assumption sets is unified with the channel type that carries αi
(where i is a fresh variable). Lastly, by soundness of CUnify the returned
contexts C1 and C2 and x : b are unified, and by soundness of BUNIFY the
annotations on P′ and Q are unified as required. Then by the certify type
rule S6(Γ1U ,Γ2U , x : (αi)j) `C² x(U) ?certifyP′:Q : []S6(b);S6(C1U ,C2U , x : b) as
required.
Correctness involves demonstrating that if a valid deduction exists for a
given process, then the algorithm is defined. We additionally assert that it
returns the most general typing:
Theorem 6.12 (Correctness) If for some Γ′,C′,P, []c there is a valid de-
duction Γ′ `C² P : []c;C′ then 〈Γ,C, []b〉 = TypeC²pi (P) is defined, and further〈
Γ,C, []b
〉 ≤ 〈Γ′,C′, []c〉.
Proof. By induction on the structure of P, and by the definition of TypeC²pi .
• P ≡ 0: From the zero type rule (and as many applications of the weaken
rule as necessary) Γ′ `C² 0 : []c; ∅ is valid for any Γ′, c. By inspection,
TypeC²pi (0) is defined and Type
C²
pi (0) = 〈∅, ∅, []i〉 (where i is a fresh variable).
Then we have 〈∅, ∅, []i〉 ≤ 〈Γ′,C′, []c〉 as ∅ ⊆ Γ′ for any Γ′ (similarly ∅ ⊆ C′),
and S([]i) = []c where S = (Id; Id[i := c]).
• P ≡!P′: By induction, completeness holds for P′, and by inspection of the
algorithm TypeC²pi (!P′) = Type
C²
pi (P) so completeness also holds for !P
′.
• P ≡ (νU)P′: By induction, completeness holds for P′: Γ′ `C² P : []c;C′ ⇒〈
Γ,C, []b
〉
= TypeC²pi (P) is defined and
〈
Γ,C, []b
〉 ≤ 〈Γ′,C′, []c〉. Then by
the restriction type rule and the definition of the algorithm Γ′U `C² (νU)P′ :
[]c;C′U and Type
C²
pi ((νU)P
′) =
〈
ΓU ,CU , []b
〉
with
〈
ΓU ,CU , []b
〉 ≤ 〈Γ′U ,C′U , []c〉
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as required.
• P ≡ P′ +Q: By induction, completeness holds for P′ and Q individu-
ally: Γ′ `C² P′ : []c;C′1 ⇒
〈
Γ1,C1, []b1
〉
= TypeC²pi (P′) is defined with〈
Γ1,C1, []b1
〉 ≤ 〈Γ′,C′1, []c〉, and Γ′ `C² Q : []c;C′2 ⇒ 〈Γ2,C2, []b2〉 = TypeC²pi (Q)
is defined with
〈
Γ2,C2, []b2
〉 ≤ 〈Γ′,C′2, []c〉. Then by the summation type
rule Γ′ `C² P′ +Q : []c;C′1,C′2. Now, by the completeness of BUNIFY
R = BUNIFY(b1, b2) is defined and correct, and similarly for Unify and
CUnify in S1 = R; Unify(R(Γ1),R(Γ2)) and
S2 = S1; CUnify(S1(C1),S1(C2)); hence〈
S2(Γ1 ∪ Γ2),S2(C1 ∪ C2), []S2(b1)
〉
= TypeC²pi (P + Q) is defined and〈
S2(Γ1 ∪ Γ2),S2(C1 ∪ C2), []S2(b1)
〉 ≤ 〈Γ′,C′1 ∪ C′2, []c〉 as required.
• P ≡ P′|Q: Similarly (without the need to use BUNIFY).
• P ≡ x(~U).P′: By the induction hypothesis, completeness holds for P′:
Γ′ `C² P′ : []c;C′ ⇒ 〈Γ,C, []b〉 = TypeC²pi (P′) is defined and 〈Γ,C, []b〉 ≤
〈Γ′,C′, []c〉. By completeness of Unify S1 = Unify
(
Γ, {x : (~αi)j, ~U : ~αi}
)
is
defined and correct (unifying the object of the type of x with the types of the
names carried by x); similarly for completeness of M and CUnify we have
S2 = S1;M
(
S1(j),S1((~αi)j)
)
(multiplying the object of the type of x with
the annotation on x as required) and S3 = S2; CUnify(S2(C),S2({x : b}))
(ensuring x in the context has the same value as the trustedness of P′)
both defined and correct. Hence by the input type rule TypeC²pi
(
x(~U).P′
)
=〈
S3(Γ~U ∪ {x : (~αi)j}),S3(C~U ∪ {x : b}), []S3(b)
〉
is defined, and〈
S3(Γ~U ∪ {x : (~αi)j}),S3(C~U ∪ {x : b}), []S3(b)
〉
≤ 〈Γ~U ,C~U , x : c, []c〉 as re-
quired.
• P ≡ x[ ~K].P′: By the induction hypothesis, completeness holds for P′:
Γ′ `C² P′ : []c;C′ ⇒ 〈Γ,C, []b〉 = TypeC²pi (P′) is defined and 〈Γ,C, []b〉 ≤
〈Γ′,C′, []c〉. Similarly by completeness of ∗TypeC²pi it also holds for ~K: Γ′ `C²
~K : ~σd1 ;C′2 ⇒
〈
Γ2,C2, ~σe
〉
= ∗TypeC²pi
(
~K
)
is defined and
〈
Γ2,C2, ~σe
〉 ≤〈
Γ′,C′2, ~σd1
〉
. Then by completeness of Unify S1 = Unify(Γ1,Γ2) is de-
fined and most general, and so is S2 = S1;M
(
S1(b),S1( ~σc)
)
and S3 =
S2;M
(
S2(i),S2(( ~σc)i)
)
by completeness of M. Again by completeness of
Unify, S4 = S3; Unify
(
S3(Γ1 ∪ Γ2),S3({x : ( ~σc)i})
)
is defined and by com-
pleteness of CUnify so are S5 = S4; CUnify
(
S4(C2),S4(FV
(
~K
)
: b, x : b)
)
and S6 = S5; CUnify
(
S5(C1),S5(FV
(
~K
)
: b, x : b)
)
. Then by the output
type rule and the definition of the algorithm TypeC²pi
(
x[ ~K].P′
)
is defined,
and
〈
S5(Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ∪ S6({x : ( ~σc)i),S5(C1 ∪ {FV
(
~K
)
: b} ∪ {x : b}), []S5(b)
〉
≤
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Γ′,C′1,C′2,FV
(
~K
)
: c, x : c, []c
〉
as required.
• P ≡ x(U) ?certifyP′:Q: By the induction hypothesis completeness holds for
P′ and Q individually; i.e.
〈
Γ1,C1, []b1
〉
= TypeC²pi (P′) ⇒
〈
Γ1,C1, []b1
〉 ≤
〈Γ′,C′1, []c〉 and
〈
Γ2,C2, []b2
〉
= TypeC²pi (Q) ⇒
〈
Γ2,C2, []b2
〉 ≤ 〈Γ′,C′2, []c〉.
By completeness of Unify, CUnify, and BUNIFY the following are all de-
fined and correct: S1 = Unify
(
Γ1, {U : αT}
)
,
S2 = S1; Unify
(
S1(Γ2), {U : S1(αU)}
)
,
S3 = S2; Unify(S2(Γ1U),S2(Γ2U)),
S4 = S3; Unify(S3(Γ1U ∪ Γ2U),S3({x : (αi)j})),
S5 = S4; CUnify(S4(C1U), S4(C2U)),
S6 = S5; CUnify(S5(C1U ,C2U),S5(x : b)),
and S7 = S6; BUNIFY(S6(b),S6(c)). Then by the certify type rule and the
definition of the algorithm,
TypeC²pi (x(U) ?certifyP′:Q) =
〈
S7(Γ1U ,Γ2U , x : (αi)j), S7(C1U ,C2U , x : b1), []S7(b1)
〉
and
〈
S7(Γ1U ,Γ2U , x : (αi)j),S7(C1U ,C2U , x : b1), []S7(b1)
〉 ≤ 〈Γ′,C′, []c〉 as re-
quired.
The soundness and correctness of the auxiliary algorithm ∗TypeC²pi is easily
proven using the previous results:
Theorem 6.13 (Soundness) If
〈
Γ,C, ~σb
〉
= ∗TypeC²pi
(
~K
)
is defined, then
Γ `C² ~K : ~σb;C.
Proof. By induction on the structure of ~K, and by definition of ∗TypeC²pi .
• ~K ≡ K: By definition, ∗TypeC²pi (K) = TypeC²pi (K) and hence soundness
holds by soundness of TypeC²pi .
• ~K ≡ K ~K ′: By definition of the algorithm, we have 〈Γ1,C1, σb1〉 = TypeC²pi (K)
and
〈
Γ2,C2, ~σc2
〉
= ∗TypeC²pi
(
~K ′
)
. By soundness of TypeC²pi we have Γ1 `C²
K : σb1;C1, and by the induction hypothesis we have Γ2 `C² ~K ′ : ~σc2;C2.
By soundness of Unify S1 = Unify(Γ1,Γ2) implies S1(Γ1 ∪ Γ2) is defined,
and similarly by soundness of CUnify S2(C1 ∪ C2) is defined given S2 =
S1; CUnify(S1(C1), S1(C2)). Hence by definition of the notation, S1(Γ1 ∪
Γ2) `C² K ~K ′ : σb1 ~σc2;C1,C2 as required.
Theorem 6.14 (Completeness) If for some Γ′,C′, ~K, ~σ′c there is a valid
deduction Γ′ `C² ~K : ~σ′c;C′ then
〈
Γ,C, ~σb
〉
= ∗TypeC²pi
(
~K
)
is defined, and
further
〈
Γ,C, ~σb
〉
≤
〈
Γ′,C′, ~σ′c
〉
.
Proof. By induction on the structure of ~K, and by definition of TypeC²pi .
• ~K ≡ K: By definition, ∗TypeC²pi (K) = TypeC²pi (K) and hence completeness
holds by completeness of TypeC²pi .
• ~K ≡ K ~K ′: Γ′ `C² K ~K ′ : σ′d1 ~σ′e2 ;C′1,C′2 implies Γ′ `C² K : σ′d1 ;C′1 and
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Γ′ `C² ~K ′ : ~σ′e2 ;C′2. By definition of the algorithm we have
〈
Γ1,C1, σb1
〉
=
TypeC²pi (K) and
〈
Γ2,C2, ~σc2
〉
= ∗TypeC²pi
(
~K ′
)
. By completeness of TypeC²pi
TypeC²pi (K) is defined with
〈
Γ1,C1, σb1
〉 ≤ 〈Γ′,C′1, σ′d1 〉, and by the induction
hypothesis ∗TypeC²pi
(
~K ′
)
is also defined with
〈
Γ2,C2, ~σc2
〉 ≤ 〈Γ′,C′2, ~σ′e2 〉.
Then by completeness of Unify and CUnify respectively, both
S1 = Unify(Γ1,Γ2) and S2 = S1; CUnify(S1(C1),S1(C2)) are defined and
most general. Hence by definition of the notation〈
S2(Γ1 ∪ Γ2),S2(C1 ∪ C2),S2(σb1 ~σc2)
〉 ≤ 〈Γ′,C′1,C′2, σ′d1 ~σ′e2 〉 as required.
7 Conclusions
An annotated type system for a higher-order pi-calculus was presented. In ad-
dition to enforcing regular safety properties, this was able to prevent insecure
data from being used in a trusted calculation. To extend the power of the
system, we introduced a simple syntax extension to the language that enabled
statically reasoning about (and proving the safety of) run-time coercion of
data trustedness.
To reason about and prove properties of the difficulties raised by a higher-
order system, including the ability to assign processes different trust values
in different environments depending on their ability to interact with the envi-
ronment, the concept of execution contexts was introduced.
A statement of subject reduction, suitably altered to reflect the dynamic
nature of the type system, was described and proven.
A type inference algorithm was presented, and statements of soundness
and correctness proven.
7.1 Related Work
The higher-order calculus and its type system were based on that presented
by Vasconcelos [20].
The prime inspiration for this research is the work of Ørbæk and Pals-
berg [13,14]. They described systems of both a functional and imperative
nature, and introduced the notion of run-time coercions on trust (that were
still able to be statically proven safe, modulo correct usage of the coercion op-
erators). Ours differs from theirs by implementing the results in a distributed
system, and by making all coercion implicit in the language thereby remov-
ing the responsibility of correctly applying it from the programmer. We also
provide a modular (abstract) certification framework.
The capabilities provided by the base annotated type system (minus co-
ercion) reflect those of many systems, commonly referred to as flow analy-
sis [19,21,3,15,5]. To the best of our knowledge, however, none of these provide
the ability to safely coerce security information at run-time.
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7.2 Future Extensions
The system presented is a solid framework, however there are many useful
programs that cannot currently be typed due to a lack of flexibility in either
the underlying type system or the handling or trustedness information. Two
proposed extensions would admit a larger set of programs: recursive types,
and a form of subtyping.
Recursive types are already present in most base type systems for the pi-
calculus [20], however since they are not vital they were omitted here as they
complicate the inference algorithm, and care must be taken in the handling
of annotations.
A subtyping relation would also allow many more programs to be typed;
in particular the form currently forbidden by the form of the output rule, as
demonstrated in example 4.5.
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